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MEANINGS OF POSSESSIONBy BUiuKE SHARTEL *

M

JUSTICE ERLE. said not so many years ago, "'Possession'
is one of the vaguest of all vague terms ;" and other judges
and writers have spoken in similar vein.' We must admit that
they have not overstated the matter. Possession is and always
has been a vague concept despite the fact that almost every legal
theorist who wrote in the last century essayed at some time in
his career to rescue this lorn concept from the mystery and confusion in which it was enveloped. As we look back over the
results of all these efforts we do not find ourselves one whit
closer to the clear-cut notion of possession which they were seeking than we were before their work began. What is the reason
for their failure? Why is our notion of possession still vague?
The answer, it seems to me, is that they hoped for the impossible.
They did not appreciate either the nature of our concepts, or the
purposes for which we generalize, or the natural limitations on our
processes of generalization.
P

*Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.
tThis paper was read at Chicago on December 29, 1931 before the
round table on Jurisprudence and Legal History at the annual meeting of the

Association of American Law Schools.
1In Reg. v. Smith, (1855) 6 Co. C. C. 554, 556; cf. Bourne v. Fos-

brooke, (1865) 18 C. B. N. S. 515, 526, 34 L. J. C. P. 164, 11 Jur. N. S.
202, 13 W. R. 497; Lyell v. Kennedy, (1887) 18 Q. B. Div. 796, 813, 56
L. J. Q. B. 303; Pollock and Wright, Possession; Words and Phrasestitle Possession. The passage quoted in the text continues: ". .. and [the
term "possession"] shifts its meaning according to the subject matter to
which it is applied,-varying much in its sense, as it is introduced either
into civil or into criminal proceedings." This last part of the learned
justice's remark expresses exactly the theme of this paper; it is unfortunate
that the force and effect of his remark has not been more generally ap.
preciated.
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I do not, therefore, propose to add one more to the already
imposing array of suggested definitions of possession. On the
contrary, I want to turn attention in the opposite direction. Instead of trying to build up a single neat formula which will embrace all the instances in which we speak of possession, I want
to make the point that there are many meanings of the word
"possession;" that possession can only be usefully defined with
reference to the purpose in hand; and that possession may have
one meaning in one connection and another meaning in another.
In short, where the older writers, in line with the logic of their
day, have brought as many cases as possible together, on the basis
of some feature of similarity among them, and have united them
all under one conceptual head, I want to break up this concept
and to emphasize instead differences between cases and the fact
that the differences are, for legal purposes, far more significant
than the likenesses which constitute the basis of unification under
one concept.2
At the outset I believe all will concede that the word "possession" has several radically different meanings. It is found in
several combinations such as de facto possession, legal possession,
physical possession, actual possession, and constructive possession.
Each of these combinations refers to a concept which careful
writers are generally at pains to distinguish from the others. To
this extent there is agreement on the proposition that possession
does have different conceptual references or meanings.' And the
2
More than six years ago I completed a rather extended essay entitled
"Taking Possession of Chattels." Since then I have always intended, largely on the advice of friends at Columbia and Michigan who went over the
manuscript, to widen the scope of the essay and make of it a book dealing
generally with the subject of possession. But the opportunity to return
to this task has thus far not presented itself. I have decided, instead, to
publish portions of the work already done in the form of separate papers;
of these the present paper is to be the first to appear in print.
3On this point the reader is referred to the discussions of possession by
the writers cited in note 4. However, these writers, as the reader will
notice, do not agree in their use of terms; for example, compare the definition of constructive possession by Salmond (Jurisprudence, 7th ed., sec.
94) with that of Pollock (Pollock and Wright, Possession, 25. 27). But
most of them agree (and properly it seems to me) as to the need to distinguish three general meanings from one another:
(1) Possession as the facts which initiate legal control. Usually the
name given to this meaning is "de facto possession." "physical possession."
or "actual possession," but sometimes, as in the case of Holmes, the word
"possession" alone is used. This meaning is considered in the first half
of the present article.
(2) Possession as the facts which must accompany a continuing legal
control as, for example, in the statement that an adverse possessor must
continue in open, notorious, etc., possession. Here writers are inclined to
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program which I have outlined above would, if fully carried out,
require that each of these meanings be separately considered and
analyzed. But we shall not be able to cover so much ground. It
will suffice for our present purpose to take up two of these meanings of possession and to examine the definitions thereof which
have been attempted. The two meanings to be examined are de
facto possession and legal possession.
I
DE FACTO POSSESSION

First, de facto possession, or possession as the facts which
initiate legal control over things (and perhaps result in liability
for larceny, for tortious taking, conversion, etc.). The characteristic method of defining possession in this sense has been to
state certain essential constituent elements thereof. This general method is, of course, one of the usual ways to define any
concept. To analyze it into constituents does help us to grasp
more clearly the nature of the concept. But writers of the last
century, in their endeavors to define possession by this method,
started with two false assumptions. They started with the assumption that it is possible to discover certain universal and necessary elements of de facto possession, and they started with the
assumption that it is possible to state these essential factual elements in the form of a typical or necessary act. They defined
possession in terms of an essential unilateral act of the possessor.
This act had for them two sides: the mental and the physical.
They spent an infinite amount of labor in the endeavor to state
the nature and characteristics of these two sides of the possessory
act. Each writer produced his own definition of possession cast
in terms of an essential animus possidendi and an essential corpus
possessionis.'
use the expression "actual possession," or to say, in regard to a person's
factual relation to a thing, that he is "in possession" or "has possession."
(3) Possession as the legal control, legal relations or other legal significance of certain facts. To designate this meaning and distinguish it from
the other two meanings writers frequently use such adjectives as "legal,"
"juristic," etc., in connection with the word "possession." This meaning
is also sometimes intended by the statement that a person is "in possession"
or "has possession." This meaning must also be distinguished from ownership, custody, and other legal relations to things. It is to be discussed in
the last half of this paper, and to avoid further repetition the reader is
referred to what is there said.
4See, for example, Markby, Elements of Law, 2d ed., sec. 334; Holmes,
Common Law, 216, et seq.; Terry, Leading Principles of Anglo-American
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(1)

Definitions in Terms of Intent and Act.-Most of

us today would be ready to repudiate forthwith the suggestion
that any such universals or essentials are to be found anywhere
in the law, and we would be prepared to reject both the discussion
and the results of these writers who pursued the vain quest for
this essential possessory act. Anyone who does not already accept the view that the quest for universals is futile would almost
certainly not be influenced by anything further which we might
say here. We shall therefore turn our attention to the other

assumption already mentioned, to wit, the assumption that possession can be successfully defined in terms of the possessor's act
and intent. Holmes, for example, seems to me to reject clearly
enough the notion that there are any universal elements of possession.5 He first calls attention to the weaknesses in theories
and definitions previously advanced. He notices that no single
generalization of the animus and corpus of possession will hold
alike for our modern common law system and for the modern
civil law systems.6 Particularly, he calls attention to the fact that
many bailees, uniformly classed as possessors in our law, are not
so classed in the civil law. He also observes that the existence
of three different rules in different common law jurisdictions as
to when whalers acquire legal control of a whale "tends to shake
an a priori theory of the matter." And other writers have made
Law, secs. 278-284; Pollock and Wright, Possession 11-16, but cf. 205-212;
Lightwood, Possession of Land 9-26; Holland, Jurisprudence, 13th ed.,
194-198; Salmond, Jurisprudence, 7th ed., secs. 96 et seq.; Williams, Personal Property 17th ed.; Goodhart, Three Cases on Possession, (1928) 3
Cambr. L. J., 195, reprinted in Essays in Jurisprudence and Common Law.
Bingham, however, denies that there is any essential corpus or animus of
possession, The Importance of Legal Possession, (1915) 13 Mich. L. Rev.
549-551,
556, 631-640.
5
Holmes, Common Law, 206-213. And see the remarks of Bingham
quoted in note 7.
Holmes wrote his celebrated treatise more than fifty years ago. I
shall have occasion to refer to it frequently in critical terms in the course
of the following discussion. While I share wholeheartedly the respect of
all serious students for this greatest of our legal thinkers, I would not do
justice to my subject if I did not point out the weaknesses in his work.
Holmes' very prestige may easily lead to the acceptance by the uncritical
of notions
which I hardly imagine he himself would entertain today.
6
The nature and elements of possession have received extensive consideration at the hands of the Continental legal theorists. See Windscheid,
Pandekten, 9th ed., by Kipp, secs. 148-150 and notes citing the civil law
authorities. Their discussions have followed the same lines as the discussions of our own writers. Indeed our writers borrowed both theories and
dogmas largely from the civilian writers who wrote before 1880. But for
our purpose, little would be gained by tracing current common law doctrines
to civilian sources which also employed a priori methods such as we mean
utterly to reject.
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similar observations; but almost without exception, each of these
7
writers concludes by working out an a priori theory of his own.
Holmes, and these other writers, purport to find certain essential
respects in which the possessory intent and the possessor) act are
fixed and constant in our common law systcn. s Definitions of
possession in terms of act and intent have so long been in vogue
that they must be squarely met; the worth of such definitions
needs to be considered.
What should, first of all, make us question the utility of this
form of definition is the fact that all the definitions of animus and
corpus ever suggested have been vague and almost meaningless.
One writer says the possessor must have the intent to control the
thing, another that he must intend to use the thing, another that
he must intend to exclude others from the use of the thing?
And the characterizations of the possessory act have been equally
vague.1-0 An examination of the cases shows the reason for this
,Holmes, Common Law, 212-213. Bingham, in his article entitled The
Nature and Importance of Legal Possession, (1915) 13 Mich. L. Rev. 535,
623, repudiates the notion that any uniform essentials of possession can
be found, and says inter alia, (at 638)"Legal possession of a physical object of property may exist in favor
of X by virtue of any of various sorts of titles; and none of these various
sorts of titles is determined by linguistic definition or by a priori, abstract
reasoning, but by practical juridical considerations of justice and policy
including custom, precedents, etc., etc., such as have produced a large
proportion of our law."
But compare what is said infra p. 634 regarding Bingham's conclusions in other respects.
8
Holmes, Common Law 215 et seq. This limitation is. doubtless, to
be understood where it is not expressed in the definitions of all the conmon law writers.
9Holmes: "If what the law does is to exclude others from interfering
with the object, it would seem that the intent which the law should require
is an intent to exclude others. I believe that such an intent is all that the
common law deems needful. . . ." Common Law 220; Salmond: ". . . the
intent to appropriate to oneself the exclusive use of the thing.
... Jurisprudence, 7th ed., sec. 97; Terry: ". . . the will to be in a position to use
if he chose.. ." [sic] Leading Principles of Anglo-American Law. sec. 281;
Pollock and Wright: "A manifest intent, not merely to exclude the world
at large from interfering with the thing in question, but to do so on
one's own account and in one's own name." Possession 17, see also 37.
And see Holland, Jurisprudence, 13th ed., 197 et seq.
10 Holmes: "To gain possession, then, a man must stand in a certain
physical relation to the object and to the rest of the world. . . . The
physical relation to others is simply a relation of manifested power co-extensive with the intent, . . . But, besides our power and intent as towards
our fellow-men, there must be a certain degree of power over the object.
... But the difference between the power over the object which is sufficient
for possession, and that which is not, is clearly one of degree only, and the
line may be drawn at different places at different times on grounds just
referred to." Common Law 216, 217. The statements of others are equally
vague and indefinite. See Terry, Leading Principles of Anglo-American
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vagueness of characterization; it shows that the vagueness is a
necessary result of the wide range of varying intentions and acts
which are sought to be brought under these definitions. Consider,
for example, the duration of the control intended by various possessors. Some possessors, like the thief, or the adverse possessor, intend to hold without limit as to time, while others, like the bailee for
hire, the honest finder and the gratuitous depositary, hold the thing
with only the most temporary control in mind. Moreover, possessory intentions or purposes range in scope from a purpose to control in every way down to a purpose to control which is almost nil.
And possessory purposes may vary in kind from the claim to use
beneficially, and without restriction, down to the mere claim to
hold as depositary for another. About all one can accurately say
of the group of cases which the writers of the last century have
brought together under the caption "Possession" is that the possessor does, in every case, entertain some purpose to control the thing.
Such a statement seems to be hardly worth making. Of what possible service to us, whether in deciding cases or in trying to classify
decided cases, is a definition of possessory intent, which leaves
out (as this one must to be accurate) all reference to the extent,
to the kind, and to the duration of the control intended?
Another point which should make us dubious about these definitions of the possessory act and intent is the fact that no writer
has ever been able to frame a definition which fitted all the cases.
Holmes, for example, who defines the possessory intent, as the
intent to exclude others, must admit that the servant in control
of his master's chattel has this intent, as well as the close physical
relation to the chattel which would make him a possessor, but
that the servant is not, in our law, regarded as possessed. Holmes
It seems obexplains this case away as a historical accident."
vious that he lays himself open here to exactly the criticism which
he makes of certain other writers in his chapter on possession; he
says: "The first call of a theory of law is that it should fit the
facts."' "2- Holmes' own definition of possessory intent does not, by
his own admission, fit the common law decisions.
Law, secs. 279, 281, 284; Salmond, Jurisprudence. 7th ed.. sees. 96-100;
Holland. Jurisprudence, 13th ed., 194-197; Pollock and Wright, Possession
11-16.
"Holmes, Common Law 227.
"-Holmes, Common Law 211. When one considers the insufficiency of
all statements of the elements of possession from the point of view mentioned in the text. and considers also how the states of fact which have
been embraced by the term de facto possession have varied in the course of
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Another striking fact is that Holmes and other writers who
undertake to define the possessory, act have never been able to
agree among themselves as to what the essentials of that act are.
Each man's effort to state the essentials has failed to stand the
test of even a short period of time. Each new writer has felt
compelled to state the essentials in a different way, so that each
effort at statement has been like writing on the sand, washed out
by the next wave of possessory definitions.'
And from a modern viewpoint the effort to define the act and
intent of possession appears as an arbitrary logical exercise. There
are many possession problems in which an act is significant. But
there are other situations in which no act whatever is involved,
and to which the same legal significance is attached as is attached
to so-called possessory acts. 14 Taking and delivery, or, as we
history, one is left with little hope of finding a fixed and final meaning for
this term.
"3See for example the definitions of intent and act cited supra notes 9
and 10, and the criticisms of one another's efforts by the authors there
cited. Anent variation in theories of possession, the following amusing
remarks of Gray about the civilian writers are pertinent:
"Take, for instance, the leading topic of possession. Before 1803.
when Savigny first published his treatise, not including the glossators. nor
the other commentators down to the end of the fifteenth century, and excluding also a great number of writings to which Savigny says it would be
paying far too high honor to say of each separately that it was good for
nothing, thirty-three authors had written on the subject. In the following
sixty-two years, down to 1865, when the seventh and last edition of
Savigny's book was published, one hundred and twenty more books and
articles had been added to the list; and before the beginning of this century
there had been published over thirty more separate treatises on the subject, not including the discussions in the general works or the articles in
the legal periodicals. More than forty years ago, Ihering was able to
enumerate eight different theories on the reason for the protection of
possession, to which eight theories he proceeded to add a ninth. Whether
it is better to protect possession with nine inconsistent theories, or without
any theory at all, is a question not to be answered offhand in favor of
the civilian position." Gray, Nature and Sources of Law. sec. 592. And
cf. Holmes, Common Law 206-211.
14This is conceded by all our writers on possession. Holmes. Common
Law 215; Salmond, jurisprudence, 7th ed., sec. 94; Pollock and Wright,
Possession 27, 39-42, 127-128; see also Bingham, The Nature and Importance
of Legal Possession, (1915) 13 Mich. L. Rev. 535, 623, at 631-035, (cf.
549-551). Thus Wright says: "Property and right to possession, and it
seems also the possession, may be shifted by operation of the common or
statute law from one person to another ....
" As exaniples lie recites
forfeiture, intestate succession, bankruptcy, succession of churchw-ardens.
of corporations, of official trustees, and claims to wreck, \x-aifs. etc. Pollock and Wright, Possession 127-128. In this connection it is also interesting to consider the following passage from Ames, in support of which
he cites Year Book cases from the time of Ed-mard II to Edwvard III."On the death of an owner in possession of a charter the heir was constructively in possession, and could maintain trespass against one who
anticipated him in taking physical possession of the charter." Ames, Lec-
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might say, unilateral and bilateral possessory acts, are not the
only legally significant factual relations to things. They are not
the only fact bases on which legal possession and other legal consequences are predicated. Indeed, there are many cases in which
ownership or legal possession of a thing is obtained by one who
is quite unaware of the thing's existence. The presence of this
group of cases makes either of two courses logically necessary:
either one has got to split one's notion of de facto possession into
two notions, which one might designate respectively "possessory
acts" and "possessory events," or else one has to abandon the
effort to define de facto possession in terms of acts, and seek for
other characteristic facts common to all of the cases of so-called
de facto possession. This latter method obviously rules out the
work of all those who have attempted to define de facto possession exclusively in terms of the act and the intent. They must
then, so far as they do continue to conjure with possessory acts,
admit that acts stand alongside of another category, possessory
events. When they do thus separate possessory acts from possessory events, they should appreciate that they have made an
arbitrary selection of material for treatment. 5 In other words,
intention is assumed in the very material which they have selected
for analysis and discussion. The presence of intent in this group
is the very basis on which the cases are chosen and on which a
division is made between this group of cases and possessory events.
But there is no reason to assume that the division is a necessary
one, or that possessory acts are entitled to emphasis and attention,
while possessory events are to be cast out like "poor, but troublesome, relations." All the writers of the last century did ignore
or markedly belittle possessory events. They tried, as far as they
could, to bring the whole field of de facto possession under their
concept of possessory act. The reason for their attitude is to be
found in the thinking of the age in which they lived. In their
tures on Legal History 57.
It ought perhaps to be called to the reader's attention that I have used
the term "possessory act" in this part of the text to mean the act as a
whole, including both the intent and the act in the narrower sense.
15But this is what none of the older writers did appreciate. They did
not perceive that their insistence on defining de facto possession in terms of
intent and act was merely an arbitrary choice of a meaning for de facto
possession, such as anyone would be free to make, and that it was not
an expression of something established in the natural order of things. See
for example, Salmond, Jurisprudence, 7th ed., see. 94, and compare Pollock
and Wright, Possession, 11-16, with the passages cited in the next preceding
note.
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day all legal interests were thought to be reducible to acts and
desires of free-willing individuals. In their day it was not clearly
perceived that the will of individuals is not legally significant
per se; that acts and events alike are significant only because, and
only to the extent that, our legal order makes them significant.
These older writers were so steeped in individualism that the importance of intention seemed to them both natural and unquestionable; to us this assumption seems artificial.
The reason why these writers did not have better success in
their efforts at definition was that they tried to state the essentials of all the possession cases in too simple a form; they tried,
characteristically emphasizing human will, to reduce the essentials of possession to the form of a unilateral act. For them the
--type case was the act of taking-occupation. They adopted -,hat
might fairly be called a taker-centricpoint of view; they failed to
perceive the complexity of the problems with which they were
dealing. Possession problems are not the simple problems which
these writers assumed them to be. The distribution of the world's
goods is not a simple process, and the maintenance of any distribution when made is not a simple matter either. Our law cannot
say without more--"Take and whatever you take should be yours,"
or "Take and you shall be liable for theft," or "Take and you
shall be liable for damages." There are always many other factors to consider besides the mere taking. And this is true when
it is to be decided whether the taker has acquired a proprietary
interest, or whether he has made himself liable criminally, or
whether he has made himself liable in tort. In any particular
problem it may be necessary to consider the competing claims of
other capable individuals, the competing interests of others who
are not capable of asserting their own claims, and the public
peace, the public welfare, and perhaps many other ends or interests of society. In short, the problem of deciding whether the
taker has or has not acquired possession is a complex and difficult problem; it is a problem into the solution of which a great
variety of factors enter. This explains why, as we have already
seen, it is not possible to work out the elements of possession exclusively in terms of a taker's act and intent. Even where act and
intention are significant (which is not alwvays the case), they do
not tell the whole story; they give us only part of it. The rest
of the story has to be told in terms of the claims and interests of
other individuals and in terms of considerations of social policy.18
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Some of the writers who undertake to define possession in terms
of the taker's act and intent do perceive rather vaguely that there
are other factors to consider; they are aware of the significance
of certain "circumstances," which attend the act of taking.'
But
they look upon these circumstances as merely incidental, or even
accidental.Rs So they also fail to get a correct perspective of the
16This is well illustrated by a group of cases in which competing
claims of finders are adjudicated. Where several persons are present
when money or other article is found, the courts are prone to declare all
persons present joint finders, rather than to hold that the first person to
discover the article or to lay his hand upon it is a sole finder. See Weeks
v. Hackett, (1908) 104 Me. 264, 71 Atd. 858; Keron v. Cashman, (N.J. Eq.
1896) 33 Ad. 1055; Cummings v. Stone, (1864) 13 Mich. 70. This attitude
is very well expressed in the following language from the first case above
cited: ".

.

. In these decisions the courts appear to have been governed by

those practical considerations of fairness and conceptions of common right
which influence just and thoughtful men in the ordinary affairs of life and
which are in harmony with the principles of equity and not discountenanced
by the rules of law."
A case put by Holmes seems to be best explained on the grounds stated
in the text: "Where two parties, (plaintiff and defendant), neither having
title, claimed a crop of corn adversely to each other, and cultivated it
alternately, and the plaintiff gathered and threw it on small piles in the
same field, where it lay for a week, and then each party simultaneously
began to carry it away, it was held the plaintiff had not gained possession.
But if the first interference of the defendant had been after the gathering
into piles, the plaintiff would probably have recovered." Common Law 235.
Because of the prior continuous assertion of a competing claim the court
demanded a more complete and clear-cut assertion of dominion than would
ordinarily be required. Thus in Haslem v. Lockwood, (1871) 37 Conn.
500, the court held that a plaintiff who had swept up manure on the street
into piles, intending to haul it away on the following day, had taken control thereof in a sense sufficient to be able to recover the value of the
manure from the defendant who hauled it away before the plaintiff returned to get it.
The whaling cases cited in note 25 illustrate the same point; we find
courts adopting three different rules in common law jurisdictions as to
when a whaler has obtained possession of a whale. The variation is to be
explained on grounds of policy; it is desirable to recognize and support
established customs in this regard. See also the discussion of the different
policies involved in property problems and in larceny problems, in Part 1I
of this7 paper.
1 The following passage from Williams, Personal Property, 17th ed.,
51 is typical,"The requisites of every original taking possession of goods, whether
as occupant, finder, or trespasser, are the same. In each case. the sole
physical control of the thing must be effectively gained, with the intent to
exclude the world at large: otherwise possession will not have been acquired. And neither an intending occupant, nor a finder or trespasser has
any title to sue for the recovery of goods, of which lie has not actually
taken possession. Whether, in any particular case of alleged taking posscssion of goods, there has been the required physical control coupled with
the necessary intent, is a question of fact to be determined with regard to
all the circumstances." See also Pollock and Wright, Possession, 13-14.
'$Indeed the act of the taker can not even be described without referring to other factors in the problem. This is apparent from a very casual
scrutiny of the discussions of Salmond, Pollock, Holmes, Holland and
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legal problems involved; they have a one-sided, over-simplified
view of possession problems. They, like the earlier writers,
stress the taker's act and intent and neglect everything else.
The regrettable results of this mistaken emphasis are apparent
in several respects. This one-sided view of possession problems
accounts for a tendency of the theoretical writers and of some
judges to treat the act and intent of the taker as alone controlling
and to overlook important considerations of policy and the legitimate expectations of other persons. Take, for example, certain
finding cases, like Bridges v. Hawkesworth;19 the court there held
the finder of a purse was entitled thereto, rather than the shopkeeper on whose premises the purse was found. The limelight
on the finder's appropriatory act threw everything else into the
shadow. The court did not stop to consider whether losers' interests would in general be better secured by attributing legal control to landowners or to finders, nor did it consider the natural
expectations of landowners in such cases. The court regarded a
taking as the normal method of acquiring legal control over chattels, and thought the shopkeeper's claim was conclusively answered by stating that he had not done any conscious act by
way of assuming control of the purse.
Again, the emphasis on the taker's or possessor's act explains
Terry. (See citations supra, note 4.) In the course of their remarks on
the essential act and the essential intent, they refer repeatedly but indirectly.
to other factors. Thus they speak of the intent to exclude others, or the
intent to use the thing, or they declare that the essential act depends on
the nature of the thing, or that the taker must obtain a certain degree of
control over the thing, or have the power to exclude others, etc. All of
these references to matters outside the act itself represent a swing in the
right direction. Other matters besides the taker's act are thus brought
into the picture. But this method of recognizing important factors is obviously incomplete and backhanded, and is not attended by a full consciousness of what is being done.
19(1851) 21 L. J. Q. B. (N.S.) 75, 15 Jur. 1079, 18 L. T. 0. S. 154.
This case must be regarded as seriously qualified in its operation, if not
actually overruled, by the later English cases. See South Staffordshire
\\rater Co. v. Sharman, 11896] 2 Q. B. 44, 65 L. J. Q. B. 460. 74 L. T.
761, 44 W. R. 653, 12 T. L. R. 402, 40 Sol. J. 532; Elwes v. Brigg Gas
Co., (1886) L. R. 33, Ch. Div. 562, 55 L. J. 734, 55 L. T. 831, 35 W. R.
192, 2 T. L. R. 782. American cases which are open to the same objection
as Bridges v. Hawkesworth, are Bowen v. Sullivan, (1878) 62 Ind. 281;
Durfee v. Jones, (1877) 11 R. I. 588; Danielson v. Roberts, (1904) 44 Or.
108, 74 Pac. 913; Roberson v. Ellis, (1911) 58 Or. 219. 114 Pac. 100.
There are also frequent statements in the American cases to the effect
that the place of finding does not matter, which by implication seems to
mean that the only thing which does matter is the taking or finding. See
for example, Tatum v. Sharpless, (1865) 6 Phila. 18; Hamaker v. Blanchard, (1879) 90 Pa. 377. For a general discussion of rights in lost,
mislaid, and abandoned goods, see Aigler, Rights of Finders, (1923) 21
-Mich. L. Rev. 664.
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the inclination of the writers mentioned to deny or ignore the
existence of cases where possession arises by operation of law, or
at best, to regard these cases as quite abnormal.2 0 These writers
give the taker's act and intent an altogether fictitious and exaggerated breadth, so as to bring within his conscious act all, or
almost all, cases where possession is obtained, and leave no cases,
or almost none, where possession is obtained "by operation of
law." Thus, where Pollock states that the possession of land
includes or involves also the possession of certain chattels of
which the owner has no knowledge, he feels it necessary to bring
in a sort of fictitious intention to justify this result. He says :
"The possession of land carries with it in general, by our law,
possession of everything which is attached to or under that land,
and, in the absence of a better title elsewhere, the right to possess
it also. And it makes no difference that the possessor is not aware
of the thing's e.istence. .

.

. It is free to any one who requires a

specific intention as part of a de facto possession to treat this as a
positive rule of law. But it seems preferable to say that the legal
possession rests on a real de facto possession constituted by the
occupier's21 general power and intent to exclude unauthorized interference.

Only a writer who was held in the grip of the old assumptions
of the importance of act and intent could have found it "preferable" to explain these cases in terms of the occupier's general
power and intent to exclude unauthorized interference.
The taker-centric viewpoint of the older writers accounts also
for their tacit assumption that taking possession hIs the same
meaning and is the same act, whether we are dealing with a problem of theft, or a problem of tort liability, or are trying to decide
whether a particular taker has obtained possession in a proprietary
sense.2 - How different are the considerations of policy involved
in these different cases hardly needs to be stated. Only a narrow
view of the mere taking, detached from everything else, could ever
have made the larcenous, the tortious, and the proprietary takings
appear to be identical. In short, their one-sided emphasis makes
the studies of these writers quite as misleading as helpful, and
robs their conclusions of a great part of their practical value to
us today.
20
See Salmond, Jurisprudence, 7th ed., secs. 94 and 99 (ad fin.)
Pollock as cited in the next note, and the authors cited supra note 14.
2Pollock and Wright, Possession 41.
22
See the discussion in Part II of this paper of the unfortunate effects
of failing to distinguish property problems from larceny problems. Cf.
also the material cited in notes 16, 25, and 26. And it is no less important
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(2) A Modern Approach-Definitions For Use.-In criticizing concepts and definitions of possession, and particularly concepts of possession cast exclusively in terms of the taker's act
and intent, it has not been the aim to take a general negative attitude toward the use of concepts and definitions. The aim has
been rather to point out that the concepts suggested in this field by
theoretical writers of the last century are one-sided, inadequate
and useless. What is wanted, rather, are definitions for usedefinitions which have utility for legal discussion.23
We have heard much in recent years about "a jurisprudence
of conceptions.

12

4

We have all, perhaps, fallen into the way of

speaking disapprovingly of conceptual or definitional methods of
solving legal problems. But this way of speaking tends to belittle
or disparage the function of concepts and definitions; it does not
indicate accurately what it is we want to criticize; it is apt to be
misunderstood. The fact is that we cannot think at all without
concepts. It is quite out of the question to carry on any legal
discussion without standard meanings-concepts. When we have
a legal problem to solve, we must have an organized body of legal
ideas with which to connect our problem situation; we must have
a system of concepts by reference to which we check and test the
validity of our tentative solutions. Indeed, concepts are essential
to thinking of any kind, and the processes of definition, classification, and division, by which we build up and clarify our concepts
and organize our knowledge, are also essential to any clear thinking; so that to speak disparagingly of the conceptual factor in our
legal thinking is simply to fail to appreciate our essential tools.
When we speak of a jurisprudence of conceptions we really
mean to refer to legal reasoning which is carried on with antiquated or maladjusted concepts. Like so many other things of
which we are hardly aware until they get out of order, we scarcely
appreciate the function which our concepts are serving until they
become maladjusted to our needs. But what is necessary is not
to distinguish between meanings of bailment or delivery (of possession)
in different connections. See notes 34, 47.
-The substance of the argument in the next few paragraphs remains as
it was originally written. I have, however, adopted several phrases such
as "definitions for use," and "definitions with reference to the purpose in
hand" which are consistently employed by Schiller, in his Logic for Use.
24
This form of expression apparently originates with Ihering-'Begriffsjurisprudenz." Dean Pound, who made Ihering's ideas familiar to
the legal profession in America, used the preferable expression "mechanical
jurisprudence"; but he also frequently uses Ihering's expression. Pound.
Mechanical Jurisprudence, (1908) 8 Col. L. Rev. 605, 610 et seq.
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to disparage our concepts or their use; rather, it is necessary to
appreciate most clearly, then of all times, that they are the tools
of our thinking and are governed by the purposes which govern
us in our thinking; that they need to be reshaped from time to
time to suit our needs. The hammer is shaped for pounding, the
spade for digging, and, to use an analogy somewhat closer to our
field of discussion, the foot is a standard length adapted to the
function of measuring. But different measures are needed for
different purposes. We would not measure eggs by the foot; a
different standard measure would be there used which was better
suited to the purpose in hand. Similarly, our legal measures, concepts, meanings must be shaped to fit their uses in legal thinking.
Ihering and, in this country, Pound helped awaken us to the importance of considering the interests or ends behind legal rights
and remedies. They showed us that a notion of rights and remedies as ends in themselves was quite inadequate. In the same
way, it seems to me that the corrective which needs to be applied
to the tools of our thinking is to re-shape them so that they reflect
or correspond to modern conceptions of legal ends. What we
need is concepts for use in legal discussion. What we need is
concepts framed with reference to the purposes of our legal order.
Our legal material must have logical organization, but the organization must be built with reference to legal purposes if it is to
serve us adequately in our thinking.
What do all these propositions mean as far as the process of
defining possession is concerned? They mean just this,-we
must define significant legal situations (legal acts and events)
with reference to the purposes in hand. The facts which give
rise to proprietary relations vary from one case to another. The
same is true of larceny cases. If possession is the name for the
significant facts in all these varying cases, the meaning of possession must also vary. In other words, instead of attempting to
develop a standard act or a standard event to cover all the cases
in which proprietary relations arise, or liabilities are imposed, on
the basis of dealings with things, instead of trying to define the
act of taking or the act of delivery for all legally significant situations, let us try to frame standard statements more particular in
type and narrower in application. Why can we not learn something here from the law of tort? Tort law also involves act, and
in some measure, events, but it is my impression that the discussion
of tortious intent and tortious act has been replaced by discussion
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of particular torts or of particular types of tort problems. In any
case, this seems to me to be the sound method of dealing with the
problems of possession in which we are interested. And along
with the particularization of problems, particularized form must
also be given to our concepts and terms. just how far we should
carry the process of developing particularized meanings, I am not
prepared to say. Perhaps, for example, we might need to develop
a particularized concept of the act or facts which suffice to confer
proprietary control of a whale.25 Whether the same standard act
or facts would serve for other purposes, such as the appropriation
of fish, or the capture of wild game on land, would depend on the
adequacy of the concept for those purposes; it would depend on
whether the concept served to characterize the facts which were
important in view of the social ends or values involved in those
specific problems.26
25But note that even for this simple situation three different acts have.
for reasons of policy, received judicial recognition in different comlon
law jurisdictions. "In the Greenland whale-fishery, by the English custom,
if the first striker lost his hold on the fish, and it was then killed by
another, the first had no claim; but he had the whole if he kept fast
to the whale until it was struck by, the other, although it then broke from
the first harpoon. By the custom in the Gallipagos, on the other hand.
the first striker had half the whale, although control of tile line was lost.
Each of these customs has been sustained and acted on by the English
courts, and Judge Lowell has decided in accordance with still a third,
which gives the whale to the vessel whose iron first remains in it. provided claim be made before cutting in. The ground as put by Lord Mansfield is simply that, were it not for such customs, there must be a sort of
warfare perpetually subsisting between the adventurers. If courts adopt
different rules on similar facts, according to tile point at which men will
fight in the several cases, it tends, so far as it goes, to shake all a priori
theory of the matter." Holmes, Common Law 212-213 (1881).
261n Young v. Hichens, (1844) 6 Q. B. 606. 1 Day. & Mer. 592. 2
L. T. 0. S. 420, where fish were almost enclosed by a seine, and persons
were stationed at the open side to frighten them so they would not escape.
it was held the fish were not reduced to possession as against a stranger
who passed through the opening and helped himself. This decision must be
regarded as somewhat arbitrary; it seems to depend on a rather mechanical
test of the sufficiency of the act; it leaves out of consideration tile reasons
for the requirement of an act (notice to others of the claim made), and it
neglects the danger of private warfare involved in ignoring the natural
claim of fishermen to receive legal protection in a lawful activity. (Cf.
Holmes, Common Law 216-218.)
Somewhat similar doubts may be expressed as to the correctness of the
rule usually assumed to be in force as to the capture of game on land.
Thus in Pierson v. Post, (1805) 3 Caines (N.Y.) 175 a fox pursued by
the plaintiff and his dogs was killed and taken by the defendant in tile
sight of the plaintiff; it was held that the pursuing plaintiff had no legal
claim to the fox. It is by no means clear that this rule will always work
satisfactorily in practice. The pursuer is apt to feel himself seriously
wronged when the game is captured by another in this manner, and it is very
doubtful whether ordinary notions of fairness and sportsmanship should
be ignored in determining this point.
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Indeed, I venture the suggestion that we have usually referred
to narrower, more particular concepts of this sort in our practical
thinking. We have probably always used more particular meanings of possession than we have assumed we were using. The
possessory act in its actual application to concrete cases always has
had, so far as it has been useful at all, a great variety of meanings, and a half-conscious selection of the appropriate meaning
for the purpose in hand has probably always occurred. All that
has resulted from framing wide and inclusive categories like possession, possessory act and possessory intent has been to cover up
the variety of actual meanings. Any broad and all-inclusive concept is almost empty of meaning; it "combines a minimum of
sense with a maximum of pretense."7 It probably does express
some small element common to the class which it embraces, but its
effect all too often is to overemphasize a relatively unimportant
element of likeness, and thus obscure more significant elements
of difference and lead the unwary into one-sided views of vital
problems.
II
LEGAL POSSESSION

We are now prepared to deal somewhat more briefly with the
second meaning of possession: Possession as the legal significance of certain facts or acts. In this sense, as has already been
indicated, we are accustomed to speak of legal possession.2" At
the outset it should be noted that de facto possession and legal
possession do not exactly correspond with one another. Not all
of the legal significance of de facto possession is embraced in the
term "legal possession," as the term is commonly used. Legal
possession is not the only form of control which arises by de facto
possession. De facto possession may give rise to ownership in
many cases, as well as to legal possession.
27 What Stephen has said of maxims, applies to all broad generalizations:
"It seems to me that legal maxims in general are little more than pert
headings of chapters. They are rather minims than maxims, for they give
not a particularly great but a particularly small amount of information."
2 History of the Criminal Law in England, 94 note.
2SPollock and Wright, Possession 16-17, 26-42, 118-119: Holmes, Common Law 214 et seq.: Salmond, Jurisprudence, 7th ed., sec. 94; Holland,
Jurisprudence, 13th ed., 194-208. All these writers make the distinction of
meaning suggested; but their terminology is not uniform. Pollock and
Wright adopt the terminology of the text, but use the word "possession"
alone as meaning legal possession. The other authors use the terms
"possession" and "de facto possession" as equivalent: and always use the
adjective legal when they mean to refer to the legal effects of de facto
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Also in another respect legal possession is narrower in scope
than de facto possession. According to common usage, legal possession refers only to beneficial legal relations to things-relations
which we might call proprietary. It does not include, usually,
liabilities for theft or tort, or liabilities as bailee or quasi-bailee,
or any other burdensome consequences, which may have arisen
out of the same fact situation as gave rise to proprietary control.
So in this respect also, legal possession does not cover all the
legal significance attached to de facto possession. When we want
to bring liabilities into the legal picture, along with possession,
we either mention them specifically; or else we bring liabilities
into the picture by the use of certain adjectives; we characterize
the taker's possession as wrongful, tortious, or larcenous. In such
case, the adjectival addition serves to place before us the liability
side of the taker's legal position along with the possessory or
beneficial side.
But we have been far from consistent in this usage and certainly not entirely successful in avoiding confusion of meaning.
It has been easy to overlook basic differences, for example, between property problems and larceny problems, just because the
term "possession" has been used in solving both kinds of problems. It has been easy to assume that possession, whether used
with or without an adjective, means the same thing for every
purpose and in every connection.
(1) Instances of Failure to Distinguish Meanings of Legal
Possessia.-A few concrete instances will make clearer the logical dangers and difficulties involved in a failure to distinguish different legal significances of possession, and particularly the failure
to differentiate possession as meaning proprietary control, possession as meaning or implying liability of some sort, and possession as meaning immunity from liability for larceny. Take the
case where "S," a servant, is sent by his master to get a watch
left with the jeweler for repair. If "S" decides to abscond and
does abscond with the watch after it has been delivered to him
by the jeweler, we shall hold, in line with the decisions, that
"S" is not liable for theft; we shall then be apt to express this
result in terms of possession; we shall say that "S" already has
possession of the watch when he appropriates it and can not,
therefore, steal it. The legal significance of the statement that
"S" has possession in this case is simply that "S" is immune from
control, or else employ some other expression such as "possession in law," "de
jure possession," or "possessory rights."
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prosecution for larceny under the circumstances. 29 It need hardly be said that "S" does not, under these circumstances, have possession in the ordinary proprietary sense.30
On the other hand, if "S" had received the watch directly from
the hand of his master, he would not have been said to have possession in either a proprietary or a larceny immunity sense.3 ' But
in a federal prohibition case, an employee was prosecuted for the
unlawful possession of liquor which he was delivering to customers
on his master's premises. The conviction was sustained on appeal.3 2 This employee could hardly be said to have proprietary
control of his employer's chattel which he was using on his employer's premises under similar circumstances. Nor would he
have been held to be immune from larceny liability if he stole this
The point is
liquor, instead of delivering it to the customers.3
that possession was ascribed to him for the purpose of the liquor
statute and only for that purpose. 4
29As Wright says: "In whom then is the possession? It was held not
to be in the alienee [master], for he has not yet received the thing, and delivery to his servant for him was not held to vest the possession in him
as against the servant (though it would be enough to entitle the master to
sue or prosecute a stranger for trespass to the servant's possession); and
as the possession must be in some one, it must be in the servant until lie does
some act amounting to a submission, attornment or delivery to the master.
Since he was thus in possession acquired without trespass it followed that
a misappropriation by him during such possession was not theft, and the
statutory felony of embezzlement was created to meet this case." Pollock
and 30
Wright, Possession 130.
1n regard to the propositions of law stated in this paragraph, see
Pollock and Wright, Possession 18, 58-60, 121-122, 191, 198, ef. 164: 2
Bishop, Criminal Law, 9th ed., secs. 823-832, 854-856.
33
3 See authorities cited supra note 30.
Kennedy v. United States, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1925) 4 F. (2d) 488.
There are other decisions on similar facts which are perhaps in conflict
with this decision. However, all the prohibition cases do treat the question
of possession as one to be decided with reference to the particular statutory
purpose and not with reference to some general concept of possession. See
(1926) 24 Mich. L. Rev. 609, and the following recent cases: Miller v.
State, (1926) 191 Wis. 477, 211 N. W. 278; People v. Germaine, (1926)
234 Mich. 623, 208 N. W. 705; People v. Leslie, (1927) 239 Mich. 334,
214 N. W. 128; Ricks v. State, (1927) 146 Miss. 659, 111 So. 752; Tuten
v. State, (1927) 36 Ga. App. 662, 137 S. E. 853; State v. Danser, (1928)
105 W. Va. 495, 144 S. E. 295; Branam v. State, (1929) 200 Inl. 575, 165
N. E. 314; McBurnett v. State, (1929) 39 Ga. App. 125, 146 S. E. 337;
Goodman v. State, (1930) 158 Miss. 269. 130 So. 285; U. S. v. Mulkis,
(D.C. Wash. 1930) 39 F. (2d) 664; MeCreless v. State, (Ala. 1931) 133
So. 313.
S3 See authorities cited supra, note 30.
34How the meaning of possession varies with reference to the purposes
of different statutes is obvious from a reading of Words and Phrases,
title, Possession. See also the interesting case of Reg. v. McDonald in
which the Court for the Consideration of Crown Cases Reserved had
before it the questions whether larceny by a bailee "depends on the
existence of a contract of bailment," and whether a prisoner whose con-
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The "hi-jacking" cases also enable us to see the differences in
meanings of possession in different connections, as well as the
differences in matters of policy which may need to be considered.
Suppose Smith steals liquor of which Jones is unlawfully possessed. Larceny liability is frequently said to require that the
thing stolen be in the possession of someone.
But the prohibition
statutes expressly abolish all property rights in illicit liquor and
make the possession thereof unlawful. These statutes mean, if
they mean anything, that Jones, the owner of this liquor, cannot
have any of the ordinary tort actions against the taker to vindicate
his proprietary interest. But can Jones' liquor be stolen? Can
the ownership or possession thereof be laid in Jones although the
law refuses to recognize his proprietary control? In People v.
Spencer it was held that the thief of illicit liquor could not be
prosecuted for larceny, because the prohibition law abolished all
property rights therein,3 6 and this view has frequently been urged
tracts are void can be guilty of this offense. An infant who was close to
the age of majority fraudulently converted to his own use goods which
had been delivered to him under an agreement for the hire of the same.
The court held that such infant was rightly convicted of larceny by a
bailee under the statute. The court clearly distinguished the meaning of
bailment for the purpose of criminal liability from bailment for the purpose of contractual liability. Queen v. McDonald, (1885) L. R. 15
Q. B. D. 323, 52 L. T. 583, 49 J. P. 695, 33 W. R. 735, 1 T. L. R. 465,
561, 15 Cox C. C. 757. Compare with this decision the earlier case of
Reg. v. Demnour, (1861) 8 Cox C. C. 440, which must be regarded as overruled by it. Martin, B., is reported to have said. "The indictment was for
larceny as bailees. The prisoners were husband and wife. A wife could
not be a bailee, and the husband was not proved to have taken any part
in the
alleged conversion ;" he accordingly directed an acquittal of the wife.
35
Wright says: "The ordinary conception of theft is that it is a violation
of a person's ownership of things; but the proper conception of it is that it is
a violation of a person's possession of a thing accompanied with an intention to misappropriate the thing. The possession which is violated may
be that of a person who has no right of ownership and no right to possession" Pollock and Wright, Possession 118. Likewise, 2 Bishop, Criminal
Law, sec. 823.
36People v. Spencer, (1921) 54 Cal. App. 54, 201 Pac. 130, in which
the court cites and relies on an earlier California case in which it wvas held
that a lottery ticket could not be stolen. People v. Caridis, (1915) 29
Cal. App. 166, 154 Pac. 1061.
The similar statements that property, in order to be stolen, "must
have an owner" or must be "capable of being owned" (2 Bishop, Criminal
Law sec. 788; Kenny, Outlines of Criminal Law, 182-186; Clark, Criminal
Law, 3rd ed., 307; 36 Corpus Juris 736) also lead to confusion. Thus
in State v. McCulloch, (reported and discussed in two interesting articles by
Prof. Sears, (1921) 21 U. of Mo. Bull. (Law Series) 3, and 22 U. of Mo.
Bull. 3) a trial judge in St. Louis held that the stealing of certain referendum petitions from the possession of the circulators was not larceny
because (inter alia) the petitions were "not the subject of private ownership." Prof. Sears criticizes this decision on the ground that the referendum petitions were private property while they remained in the hands
of the circulators and were therefore larcenable. Perhaps his view is
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in other cases, but, fortunately, without success. The courts have
refused, except in the Spencer Case, to be misled by word juggling. They have rejected the notion that liquor cannot be stolen
simply because it cannot be possessed in a proprietary sense.."
In reaching their conclusions they have gone into the purposes
behind the law of theft and behind the prohibition acts. They
have seen, in effect, that the question whether the holder of liquor
has possession in the proprietary sense is quite a different question
from the question whether he bears such a relation to the liquor
as should be protected, in the name of the state, against unlawful
aggression.
The mislaid goods cases furnish another example of the logical difficulties which may result from a failure to observe the
difference in meaning just referred to. Take the case of a pocketbook, inadvertently left on a table in a barber shop by a customer."
Here it would ordinarily be said in a property case that the barber
has constructive possession of the purse, even before he discovers
it. He is entitled to its control as against the finder and all third
parties." On the other hand, it seems to be held with equal uniformity that the barber himself would be liable for theft, if he
misappropriated the contents of the purse with felonious intent. 4
correct. But it seems preferable to say simply that ownership as used
in these statements has not the ordinary proprietary significance, and that
goods, in order to be stolen, do not need to be "owned" in the full proprietary sense. And as regards the liquor statutes, it should be noticed
that they explicitly declare the possession of liquor to be unlawful, even
though they also declare that there shall be no proprietary rights in liquor.

S1lllicit Liquor (Volstead Act) : Hoback v. United States, (C.C.A. Va.
1922) 284 Fed. 529; People v. Wilson, (1921) 298 III. 257, 131 N. E. 609;
People v. Otis, (1923) 235 N. Y. 421, 139 N. E. 562; State v. Schoonover,
(1922) 122 Wash. 562, 211 Pac. 756.
Illicit Liquor (State Statutes): Mance v. State, (1908) 5 Ga. App.
229, 62 S.E. 1053; August v. State, (1912) 11 Ga. App. 798, 76 S.E. 164:
State v. May, (1866) 20 Ia. 305; Ellis v. Comm., (1920) 186 Ky. 494,
217 S.W. 368; Comm. v. Coffee, (1857) 75 Gray (Mass.) 139 (Cf. Coin.
v. Rourke, (1852) 64 Cush. (Mass.) 397; Arner v. State, (1921) 19 Okl.
Cr. 23, 197 Pac. 710; State v. Donovan, (1919) 108 Wash. 276, 183 Pac.
127. Other chattels held or used for an unlawful purpose: Bales v. State.
(1868)

3 W. Va. 685 (gambling instruments) ; Smith v. State, (1918)
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Ind. 253, 118 N. E. 954; Osborne v. State. (1906) 115 Tenn. 717, 92 S. V.
853.
'sLawrence v. State, (1930) 1 Humph. (Tenn.) 228.
39 McAvoy v. Medina, (1866) 11 Allen (Mass.) 548; Kincaid v.
Eaton, (1867) 98 Mass. 139; Loucks v. Gallogly, (1892) 1 Misc. Rep. 22. 23
N. Y. S.126; Foster v. Fidelity Safe Deposit Co., (1912) 160 Mo. App. 165,
145 S. W. 139, affd. (1915) 264 Mo. 89, 174 S. W. 376; Heddle v. Bank
of Hamilton, (1912) 17 B. C. 306. See also Commercial Bank v.
Pleasants, (1841) 6 Whart. (Pa.) 376; Livermore v. White. (1883) 74
Me. 452; Silcott v. Louisville Trust Co., (1924) 205 Ky. 234. 265" S.W. 612
402 Bishop, Criminal Law, 9th ed., secs. 879, 882; (1920) 5 Corn. L. Q.
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Some courts have been troubled by the difficulty of reconciling
these two lines of authority with one another and with the cardinal
doctrine of the law of theft that one cannot steal chattels of which
one is already possessed. 4' The simple explanation, it seems to
me, is that the property problem, to wit, whether the landowner
has legal control of the mislaid chattel as against the world generally, and the theft problem, to wit, whether he wrongfully deals
with the chattel in disregard of the mislayer's interest, are quite
different legal problems. Legal control must be defined in each
case with reference to the purpose in hand. The two problems
can not be treated as identical. And if we solve both in terms
of possession, we must recognize that the word possession is not
used in the two problems for the same purpose and with the
same significance.
Merry v. Green is another case to consider in this connection. 4 The plaintiff bought at public auction a bureau in which he afterwards discovered, in a secret drawer, a purse containing money,
which he appropriated to his own use. At the time of the sale,
no person knew that the bureau contained anything whatever.
The defendant seller initiated a prosecution for larceny against
the plaintiff. The prosecution was later dropped, and the plaintiff
sued for false imprisonment. Defendant's case depended on
whether the plaintiff had been guilty of larceny in appropriating
the money. The court had to pass on two questions which are
related to our present discussion. 43 First, whether the ownership
of the money had passed to the plaintiff by the delivery. This the
court denied for the reason that the intention to transfer money
had not existed. Second, the court had to decide whether the
455, 456. It seems that the person who misappropriates muislaid goods is
liable even though he does not know who the owner is, or though there is

nothing about the goods which makes it appear that he can discover the

owner.
4
'As to this doctrine see generally 2 Bishop, Criminal Law 9th ed.. stcs.
799-803, 882; Kenny, Outlines of Criminal Law, 181-186 (a modern English text). In State v. Courtsol, (1915) 89 Conn. 564, 94 At. 973 the
difficulty of reconciling the property cases with the criminal law cases was
mentioned. See also (1920) 5 Corn. L. Q. 455. The court in the Courtsol
case explains away the difficulty by declaring that the mislayer still has
constructive possession and that the landowner has custody but not possession. This explanation, however, does not accord with the ordinary use
of terms, nor explain the legal control which the landowner enjoys as
against third persons and which would ordinarily be called legal possession
or constructive possession.

42(1841) 7 M. & W. 623.
43A

third question, namely-whether the plaintiff had acted in good

faith, was important to the decision, but obviously has no relation to our
present purpose.
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delivery of the bureau containing the money constituted a delivery
of possession in such sense as to prevent the plaintiff from becoming liable for larceny by a later conversion. The court denied
that the mere delivery of the bureau would give possession of
the money in this sense. The case seems to be well decided oil
both points. Of course, the ownership of the money did not
pass from the seller to the buyer of the bureau. But what if the
question of legal control had come up between the plaintiff and
the boy who first discovered the money while he was repairing
the bureau in the plaintiff's home? Which of these two should
have had the superior claim? Merry v. Green does not even
touch this point. It deals only with the question of the buyer's
claim to the money as against the former owner of the bureau
and the question of his non-liability for larceny by reason of the
delivery of the bureau to him. But I venture to think that the
owner of the bureau should have the better claim as against tile
casual finder in this case, and I have no reason to think that the
court which decided Merry v. Green would have decided otherwise on these facts. Yet, in many later property cases, as for
instance, Durfee v. Jones,44 and Bowen v. Sullivan,45 Merry v.
Green has been used to show that one can not acquire possession
of a chattel in a proprietary sense, except if he knows that he is
acquiring it; the case has been cited as authority for the proposition that the finder rather than the owner of the bureau would
have the better right. This, it seems to me, is a radical niisunderstanding and misuse of the decision.
Bridges v. Hawnkesworth is another interesting case. 4" This
case seems to rest largely on a mistaken identification of possession as signifying proprietary control and possession as signifying accountability for safekeeping. The court assumes that if tile
shopkeeper in whose shop the purse was lost were to be regarded as
possessed thereof in a proprietary sense, he must also be accountable for its safekeeping. The court stresses the fact that the
shopkeeper could not fairly be held accountable for the safekeeping of a purse of whose existence he did not know, and argues
from this assumption that he could not have a proprietary control
of the purse. It may be true, and quite properly, that the law does
not make one liable for the safekeeping of another's goods until
44(1877) 11 R. I. 588. See also Bridges v. Hawkesworth, (1851)

21

L. J. Q. B. (N.S.) 75, 15 jur. 1079, 18 L. T. 0.S. 154.
45(1878) 62 Ind. 281.
46(1851) 21 L. J. Q. B. (N.S.) 75, 15 Jur. 1079, 18 L. T. 0. S. 154.
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one has consciously assumed the control of then.4

But, it does

not follow from this that the landowner may not have a superior
proprietary claim to things on his land, even though he is unaware
of their presence there. In fact, in some cases the modern authorities do recognize the landowner's superior claim.4 8
Other cases might be cited where the failure to distinguish
different meanings of possession and the nature of different socalled possession problems has made difficulty for courts and
writers. But these suffice to make the point intended. It should
only be added that the confusion of different meanings of legal
possession has not been peculiar to theoretical writers, nor to
judges in a few decisions. Modem text-books and case-books
show amply the confusion of meaning which we have been criticizing. Standard criminal law texts cite property cases, as well as
larceny cases, in the discussion of the sufficiency of the act of taking
in theft.4

9

And certain larceny cases are cited as authorities in

works on personal property50 In fact, in one modern case-book
on personal property all of the cases included which deal with the
necessary intent in taking possession are criminal cases!" The
dangers of confusion which are courted by such uses of material
are too obvious to call for further comment.
47See note in 1 A. L. R. 394, 398. That legal possession does not depend on accountability is recognized in the Winkfield, [19021 Probate 42.
71 L. J. P. 21, 85 L. T. 668, 50 W. R. 246, 18 T. L. R. 178, 46 Sol. J. 103.
9 Asp. M. L. C. 259, and see Holmes, Common Law, lecture 5, The
Bailee8 at Common Law.
4 See Aigler, Rights of Finders, (1923) 21 Mich. L. Rev. 664; Silcott
v. Louisville Trust Co., (1924) 205 Ky. 234, 265 S. \V. 612; McDowell
v. Ulster Bank, (1899) 33 Ir. L. T. 225; Commercial Bank v. Pleasants,
(1841) 6 Whart. (Pa.) 375; South Staffordshire Water Co. v. Sharman.
[1896] 2 Q. B. 44, 65 L. J. Q. B. 460, 74 L. T. 761,44 W. R. 653, 12 T. L. R.
402, 40 Sol. J. 532; and compare the passage from Pollock and Wright,
quoted supra, note 21. On the other hand, Weeks v. Hackett. (1908) 104
Me. 264, 71 AtI. 858, Danielson v. Roberts, (1904) 44 Or. 108, 74 Pac. 913.
and other decisions which seem to recognize the claim of the finder
as superior to that of the landowner are perhaps explainable on the
ground that these jurisdictions have statutes dealing specifically with the
disposition of lost goods.
49E. g., 2 Bishop, Criminal Law, 9th ed., secs. 776, 7/7.
5OThus Pollock, who discusses the law of possession in its proprietary
aspects (parts I and II of Pollock and Wright, Possession), repeatedly
relies on cases from the law of theft. The larceny cases most frequently
referred to are: Merry v. Green, (1841) 7 M. & W. 623, 10 L. J. M. C.
154, 151 E. R. 916; Reg. v. Ashwell, (1885) L. R. 16 Q. B. Div. 190, 55
L. J. M. C. 65, 53 L. T. 773, 50 J. P. 181, 198, 34 W. R. 297, 2 T. L. R.
151, 16 Cox C. C. 1; Reg. v. Thurborn, (1849) 1 Den. C. C. 387, T. & M.
67, 18 L. J. M,. C. 140, 13 J. P. 459; and Reg. v. Rowe. (1859) Bell's
C. C. 93, 28 L. 3. M. C. 128, 32 L. T. 339, 23 J. P. 117, 5 Jur. N. S.
274, 7 W. R. 236,3 Cox C. C. 139.
51
Warren, Cases on Property 27-40.
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(2) Legal Possession as Proprietary Control.-Now let us
turn to our last point-the definition of legal possession, that is
to say, legal possession limited in meaning to proprietary control
over things. The discouraging results of efforts to define de facto
possession, as well as the lessons we learn from a consideration of
those efforts, might justify us in refraining from further discussion of definitions of possession, but there is one aspect of the
definitions of legal possession which does seem to me to deserve
further notice. It has been commonly assumed that legal possession is a concept of fixed and invariant meaning, that it has the
same legal import in every place where it is used."2 Even Bingham, who almost twenty years ago wrote an excellent article regarding legal possession, in which he repudiated vigorously the
notion that there is an essential animus or corpus which must exist
at the beginning of legal possession, concludes by asserting that
the meaning of legal possession itself is constant.5 3 He finds that
legal possession is composed of a standard set of possessory
rights. Insofar as he reaches this conclusion he seems to me to
fall, like his predecessors, into a priori methods. Logically, his
result is hardly different from theirs. He simply discovers the
constant feature in a different place. Instead of a supposedly
constant act (facts) which constitutes for the olders writers de
facto possession, Bingham discovers a supposedly uniform set
of legal consequences.
The common constant feature of legal possession has been
taken to be either the availability of certain forms of action for
the vindication of the possessory interest, or else the existence of
a certain group of "possessory" rights, such as Bingham assumes.
I submit that the effort to state the essentials of legal possession
in terms of a certain number of remedies or rights is just as inadequate and one-sided as the attempt to analyze de facto pos52

Holmes, Common Law 215; Pollock and Wright, Possession 16-20,
118, 119; Salmond, Jurisprudence, 7th ed., secs. 94, 106, 107.
53Bingham, Nature and Importance of Legal Possession, (1915) 13
Mich. L. Rev. 535, 623; at page 635 this author says, "What then (o we
mean by legal possession? What is the legal hold on the land or chattel
to which this term refers? Search as we will, we shall find no element
or set of elements which is universally present in situations to which the
term is applied, and universally absent when legal possession is denied,
except those possessory legal rights, etc., which make the term of technical
importance. Whenever it is held that legal possession of certain land
exists in X. it is held that X has legal rights and liberties in the land of the
sort which I have hitherto indicated roughly by the term possessory rights.
etc. Whenever it is held that Y has not legal possession of certain land. it
is held that he has not possessory rights of this sort."
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session in terms of a taker's act and intent. Indeed, legal possession does not appear to be constant or to have the same meaning
in all the cases where it is assumed to be constant. Legal possessors do not all have exactly the same number of rights or
remedies, even if we take the number of rights or remedies as the
criterion of possession. To start with, some possessors, like bailees
or pledgees, have rights and remedies available against the reversioner or owner; wrongful possessors (and perhaps others) do not
have any such rights or remedies. And as to the availability of
replevin, trover, and ejectment, there appear to exist today wide
discrepancies as among various possessors. In spite of sweeping
statements in Amory v. Delamirie,5 4 Asher v. IVhitlock," and The
Winkfield,56 it must be seriously questioned whether every possessor has a special property good as against all the world except the
owner or a prior possessor. In this country, at least, there is authority to the effect that a wilful trespasser is not entitled to recover in ejectment 7 or replevin from a later holder who has
entered in good faith and under color of title. This view, if
accepted, means that the interest of such a wrongful possessor is a
narrower one than the interests of bailees and bona fide finders.
His interest is not available against as many people and it does
not involve all the remedies which would be available to bailees.
While the action of-trespass is theoretically available to all possessors, as against all third parties who interfee with their legal
control, this remedy, common to all possessors, can not be re-4(1722) 1 Strange 505.
r'5(1865), L. R. 1 Q. B. 1, 35 L. J. Q. B. 17, 13 L. T. 254. 30 J. P. 6:
11 Jur. (N.S.) 925, 14 W. R. 26.
56[1902] Probate 42; 71 L. J. P. 21, 85 L. T. 668, 50 V. R. 246. 18
T. L. R. 178, 46 Sol. J. 163, 9 Asp. M. L. C. 259.
57(1929) 28 Mich. L. Rev. 184. Cf. Wiren, The Plea of the Jus Tertii
in Ejectment, (1925) 41 Law Q. Rev. 139; and Winchester v. Stevens Point.
(1883) 58 Wis. 350, 17 N. W. 3, 547; Waltermeyer v. Wisconsin. etc.. Ry.
Co.. (1887) 71 Iowa 626, 33 N. W. 140; Kelley Y. New York. etc.. Ry..
(1880) 81 N. Y. 233; and cases in 2 Lewis, Eminent Domain. 3rd ed.. secs.
659, 661.
5SAt least this seems to me to be the effect of the cases, although the
proposition as stated in the text is not always accepted in the words there
used. It should, however, be said that most of the cases in which the
broad principle is stated that a prior possessor can recover as against any
later possessor were in fact cases of bailment and were in fact cases in
which a bailee was claiming as against a later wrongdoer in an action of
trespass or trover; in such cases the courts have very properly held the prior
claim to be superior to the later. But there is room to doubt (despite the
usual affirmative assumption) whether the wrongful taker should recover
the full value of the chattel in a suit against a later claimant who takes
or otherwise obtains possession of the chattel. Barwick v. Barwick et al.,
(1850) 33 N. C. 80. See also 27 Mich. L. Rev. 936.
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garded as highly significant; especially as the damages which a
possessor will recover in trespass will frequently be inconsequential. Certainly, it is hard to see why the availability of this one
narrow remedy should serve in this day and age as the sole
criterion for constructing as wide and supposedly important a
concept as legal possession.
But it is not my purpose to pick technical or petty flaws in the
definitions of legal possession which have been offered. The substantial objection to them is that they all emphasize features of
the cases which today seem relatively unimportant, and neglect
other highly important aspects of legal situations which they bring
together under the one caption, "legal possession." We might
fairly ask, what does it matter if all legal possessors do have
exactly the same number of rights or exactly the same number of
remedies? Under definitions built on these lines, there is no substantial distinction between the legal possession of a bailee for a
week, the legal control of the seller who has passed title but retains possession as security for the price, the possession of the
pledgee with whom a chattel has been left as security for a loan,
the possession of the gratuitous depositary, and the possession
of the thief. On the real property side, there is no distinction to
be made between the possession of a long-term lessee, the possession of one who is acquiring title by adverse holding, and the
possession of the tenant at will. All these instances may be taken
for the sake of the argument to involve the same number of
rights and remedies. But can we afford to ignore all the elements
of social and legal value which are behind these rights and remedies? We bring things together under one concept in accordance
with some principle or purpose. The concept itself represents a
principle of selection. The principle of selection of those who
have built our conventional concepts of legal possession has been
simply, equality in the number of rights or remedies.5 9 That
fact ought to be clearly appreciated in order to understand by
contrast how much of legal significance and legal difference their
concept fails to take account of,-all such matters as variation in
scope, duration, and certainty of control are left out of the reckon59
We would not assert that concepts such as de facto possession or possessory act have no meaning whatever; we would not say that legal possession, although predicated on a narrow likeness in the number of remedies or
rights, may not have some utility. The very fact that we have used these
concepts in our discussion shows that they serve some purpose. But their
utility is narrow, just as the basis or principle on which they are built is
narrow. A concept built on a mere count of remedies will be significant
only to the extent that such a count will be.
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ing. The likeness between legal possession cases is merely a conceptual likeness-=a likeness in our legal material when we look at
it from one particular point of view; it is a man-made, logical concept.6" Like all concepts it is built to emphasize a certain likeness. And we may well doubt whether this procedural likeness
is of primary importance from a modern viewpoint. To me, it
seems much more important today to stress the scope, duration,
and other features expressive of the values of legal interests.
To this end we ought either to abandon the use of the concept legal
possession entirely, or what is probably more practical, to use it
with various explanatory phrases which take care of the manifold
differences of meaning.
60
That one can save the face of the initial assumption that possession
is a constant quantity by a bit of logical juggling is, of course, true. One
can say that the depositary has bare possession, just as the pledgee has, but
that the pledgee has something in addition. This is the very kind of thing
that is said in reference to the larcenous act, by those who want to save
the face of the doctrine that all acts of taking are alike. The larcenous
act is said to be the same act as the proprietary act, plus a few other
characteristics and qualities. By this method one can make virtually any
concept appear to be constant and invariant. One can drag in another
concept, such as the pledgee's interest, or, in reference to land. the possessor's estate, in order to absorb the real differences between different cases
of possession and allow the concept of possession itself to remain fixed and
immutable. But this method of saving the stability of our concepts is
vicious; it only induces bad thinking; it is calculated to maintain concepts
intact after they have gotten badly out of adjustment. Instead of exerting
one's effort to preserve concepts in seemingly constant and unchanged form,
one ought rather to spend that effort usefully, in the endeavor to revamp
one's concepts with reference to constantly changing legal purposes.

